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My paper discusses a certain worry that was apparent among European intellectuals in the 17th 
and 18th century, a worry that sounds all too familiar in the age of internet, namely, that with 
the progress of knowledge, there are simply too many books. I will focus on the idea of 
encyclopedias being a possible remedy for this. In various texts from this era, an encyclopedia 
is portrayed as a compact library, a book of all books that almost makes other books redundant. 
But for such a project to succeed, for an encyclopedia to be useful and readable, it must not only 
summarize the achievements of the sciences, but even more importantly, it must organize its 
content well. This had proven to be by far the greatest challenge for those who dared 
undertaking such a venture. Drawing the lines between disciplines and imagining a system of 
their divisions and subdivisions is an arbitrary affair. In fact, it can be claimed that the early 
modern period had produced as many classifications of knowledge as there were reformers who 
conceived them. My paper focuses on describing two strategies of the early modern 
encyclopedias (or plans for them) to keep a sense of unity in this multitude: the one by Diderot 
and d’Alembert in their Encyclopédie and the one envisioned by Leibniz. I argue that Leibniz’s 
plan, although overly ambitious and therefore never executed, provided some truly novel tools, 
such as an comprehensive use of an index, that surpassed the organizational structure of the 
later French work in its organizing potential. 
 




I. The information overload and the encyclopedia 
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It has been well documented, especially by scholars writing on the early modern 
period, that the so-called information overload is nothing peculiar to our digital age.
1
 




 centuries had wholly different standards for the 
form in which knowledge should be presented in order to avoid a sense of 
unmanageability. Not only is it necessary, as they thought, that anybody be able to find 
quickly a piece of information, a description of a phenomenon, a definition, or an 
evidence, but also should these units of knowledge be presented in a way that reveals 
their placement in the general scheme of human scientia. Thinkers like Bacon, 
Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, and Diderot saw the abundance of books, experiments, 
descriptions, theories, calculations, reports, letters etc. as something that had become 
increasingly difficult to follow. But the reason for concern was not simply the volume 
of data, but rather the absence of an articulated framework, of a sort of map of 
knowledge these contributions would conform to. An endless accumulation of writing 
was principally a challenge of taxonomy. Assumed novelty and utility were often 
merely disguised repetition and futility, and even in the cases when important findings 
had been made, the fact that they were rarely presented as genuine contributions to the 
existing body of science annoyed Leibniz to the point where he feared that mankind 
would fall back into barbarism. One can sense a mixture of panic and resignation in the 
following laments: 
 
However, we are not aware of our wealth, like a trader without bookkeeping or a library 
without an index. In the form we actually operate, we may perhaps be useful for our 
remote descendants, but we will not benefit from the fruit of our work. We endlessly 
dispute, we endlessly accumulate, we seldom reach a demonstration of anything or its 
consignation to a repertoire – in short, we hardly make use of our studies. If we go on 
like this, it is to be feared that an irremediable damage be caused, and barbarian times 
will return due to the tediousness of scholarship, in view of the fact that the huge 
multitude of objects and books destroys all hope for pleasure and hides solid and useful 




Diderot went even further in his article “Encyclopédie,” saying that because books 
constantly multiply without order or measure, “one can predict a time when it will be 
almost as difficult to learn something from books as from the universe itself.”3 
The idea of a carefully compiled encyclopedia, which could provide a solution for 
the incessant torrent of books by rendering the majority of them redundant, is suggested 
by a number of very similar statements in the introductions to many such works of the 
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in the early modern period. 
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 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “Project of a New Encyclopedia to be written following the method of 
invention,” in The Art of Controversies, ed. and trans. Marcelo Dascal (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 130. 
See also his “Precepts for Advancing the Sciences and Arts,” in Leibniz. Selections, ed. and trans. Philip 
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3
 Denis Diderot, “Encyclopédie,” in Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des arts et des metiers, 17 
vols., ed. Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d’Alembert (Paris: Le Breton [et al.], 1651-1665), vol. 5, 644A. 
Wherever the original source in French is quoted, the translation is my own. 
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seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Ephraim Chambers, for instance, wrote in the 
Preface to his Cyclopaedia (1728):  
 
[A] Work accomplished as it ought to be, on the Footing of this, would answer all the 
Purposes of a Library, except Parade and Incumbrance, and contribute more to the 
propagating of useful Knowledge through the Body of a People, than any, I had almost 




By the time Diderot and d’Alembert had started the editorial work on the first volumes 
of the Encyclopédie, the idea of a complete catalogue of human knowledge had lost 
some of its boldness, yet the plan of making their encyclopedia a substitution for a 
library remained. Diderot was convinced that »for a sophisticated man [un homme du 
monde], this work could replace a library in all fields of knowledge; and for a 
professional scholar, in all fields but his own.«5 One can find a similar ambition even in 
Bayle’s Dictionnaire historique et critique, which is, of course, far from an 
encyclopedia in the proper sense: “I considered that a work such as this should replace a 
library to a great many people.”6 So, if the encyclopedia was supposed to become the 
book of all books, then the bulk of treatises, ideas, documents, and experiment reports 
had to be reread, reviewed and classified; duplications had to be omitted, mistakes 
corrected, in a word, the whole literary production of mankind had to be ruthlessly 
edited, so that it would not take up more than a very limited number of volumes. 
I shall outline the main features of two great endeavours of this period, the 
Encyclopédie of Diderot and d’Alembert (probably the most important work of the 
Enlightenment), and Leibniz’s idea of a demonstrative encyclopedia, of which only a 
series of outlines were made. The two projects have a lot in common. Leibniz is perhaps 
one of the first reformers of science to understand that a project of the complete 
catalogue of knowledge, rationally organized, could not possibly be a one-man affair. 
He can perhaps be viewed as a predecessor of the Encyclopédie in that – unlike some of 




 centuries, like Johann Alsted, John 
Comenius or Chambers – he saw cooperation of professionals as the only way to carry 
through such an enterprise. Another element shared by both endeavours is the 
recognition of the fact that the catalogue of human knowledge would not be complete 
without the description of various arts and trades, manual skills, manufacturing 
processes, but also children’s games and other matters of life quite unconnected to what 
had traditionally been counted among things worthy of scholars’ attention. Leibniz was 
aware before Diderot that there exists a whole world of practical knowledge that had 
never been properly described. It is evident, then, that the idea of the encyclopedia 
shared by Leibniz and the two editors of the Encyclopédie went even beyond the editing 
of the written knowledge, as it was designed to publish the reports about human 
                                         
4
 Ephraim Chambers, Cyclopaedia, or, An universal dictionary of arts and sciences, 2 vols. (London: 
1728), vol. 1, ii. 
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activities that were not new, but had until then remained undocumented or private. In 
both cases was the principal benefit of an encyclopedia found in public access to 
knowledge, which was obstructed by the disorder of books in the case of sciences and 
by their deficiency in the case of the arts and trades. In short, written but unorganized 
knowledge and unwritten knowledge were considered equally useless. 
It might be said that although Diderot and d’Alembert admired Leibniz’s 
encyclopedic attempts, as far as they were acquainted with them, they managed to 
complete their project precisely for the fact that they had abandoned the system of 
unprecedented complexity that Leibniz’s plan seemed to presuppose. I will try to show 
how Leibniz’s ideals about an encyclopedic work can be understood as a critique of all 
traditionally organized encyclopaedias, including – anachronistically – the one of 




II. The Encyclopédie 
 
The Encyclopédie, published by d'Alembert and Diderot continually from 1751 to 
1772, was an enormous project: seventeen volumes of textual entries (accompanied by 
eleven volumes of plates) contain almost seventy-three thousand articles and sub-
articles written by more than hundred and forty contributors. The very idea of creating a 
complete catalogue of human knowledge in sciences, arts and crafts, must have 
appeared to the general editors as facing the impossible. But the Encyclopédie was 
meant to be much more than that and this is where the problem begins: is it possible to 
collect such an immense body of knowledge in one place but at the same time to 
connect its particular parts (entries or articles) into some form of a system? What would 
it take to devise an adequate system, one that would represent the structure of both the 
intellectual and natural world?  
Both editors put a lot of effort in this so-called encyclopedic order. The alphabetical 
ordering of the articles, however useful it may be, was perceived by them as baring a 
significant inconvenience, namely, that the interconnections of individual parts of 
knowledge, represented here as explanations in the form of articles, became radically 
fragmented and scattered throughout the volumes of the work. As they believed, a 
particular science or an art is constituted by a chain of explanations starting with its 
principal terms and proceeding to its more relative, subordinate terms, or terms that 
cannot be understood without knowledge of the former. The alphabetical ordering, 
while necessary, does not reflect this systematic unity. In an attempt to remind the 
readers of the essential integrity of the work, the editors had chosen a title, which 
underlined its double structure: Encyclopedia, or, a Reasoned Dictionary of the 
Sciences, Arts and Trades. ‘Encyclopedia’ and ‘Dictionary’ are not synonyms, or, as 
d’Alembert puts it in the beginning of the Preliminary Discourse, “[a]s a Reasoned 
Dictionary of the Sciences, Arts, and Trades, it is to contain the general principles that 
form the basis of each science and each art, liberal or mechanical, and the most essential 
facts that make up the body and substance of each.” As an Encyclopedia, on the other 
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hand, “it is to set forth as well as possible the order and connection of the parts of 
human knowledge.”7  Or as Diderot notes in the etymological reminder in the 
Prospectus (a text announcing the Encyclopédie one year prior to the publication of its 
first volume), the word ‘encyclopaedia’ means l’enchaînement, the linking of 
knowledge into a circle of sciences.
8
 
What, then, does this encyclopaedic ordering, designed to transform the contents of 
the alphabetical dictionary into a connected whole, consist in? In general, it can be said 
to have two basic elements. The first is the so-called système figuré, a systematic chart, 
or a classificatory tree of sciences, arts, and trades, which the editors based on Bacon’s 
classification in the Advancement of learning. This chart, which is a part of the 
Preliminary discourse, divides all human knowledge according to the three principal 
faculties of the soul, namely memory, reason, and imagination, to which three main 
branches of human activity correspond – history, philosophy, and art. These are then 
subdivided further according to subject matters, for example, philosophy is ruled by a 
general science of metaphysics, or science of being, and has three parts, science of God 
(theology), science of man, and science of nature. Science of nature, generally defined 
by particular metaphysics of bodies (or general physics), is divided into mathematical 
and physical sciences, the mathematical are pure and mixed, etc. Or, to take an example 
from a different branch: history is sacred, civil, or natural; natural history, for instance, 
deals with either uniformity of nature (history of the universe, heavenly bodies), its 
irregularities (monsters, natural marvels and nature’s special effects), and the different 
usages of nature (crafts, manufactures). The latter are then subdivided into special 
activities according to the type of material they use, etc. Every article head then also 
contains the name of the science, or an art, to which the entry belongs, so that the reader 
can quickly consult this systematic chart and thus know to which part of the tree of 
sciences an article relates. 
Diderot and d’Alembert were aware of the arbitrariness of all such taxonomies. 
Every division takes specific criteria into account and classifies everything in 
accordance with them. Every systematic chart bold enough to include the totality of 
human endeavours inevitably adopts a certain point of view, from which it describes 
and thus excludes other points of view. In a famous and probably most quoted passage 
of the Preliminary Discourse, d’Alembert compares the editor’s work to cartography:  
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[The encyclopedic arrangement of our knowledge] consists of collecting knowledge 
into the smallest area possible and of placing the philosopher at a vantage point, so to 
speak, high above this vast labyrinth, whence he can perceive the principal sciences and 
the arts simultaneously. From there he can […] discern the general branches of human 
knowledge, the points that separate or unite them; and sometimes he can even glimpse 
the secrets that relate them to one another. It is a kind of world map [mappemonde], 
which is to show the principal countries, their position and their mutual dependence, the 
road that leads directly from one to the other. This road is often cut by a thousand 
obstacles, which are known in each country only to the inhabitants or to travellers, and 
which cannot be represented except in individual, highly detailed maps. These 
individual maps will be the different articles of the Encyclopedia and the Tree or 




The form of the encyclopaedic tree of sciences therefore necessarily depends on the 
chosen viewpoint of the philosopher-cartographer. No point of view is a priori 
privileged, and thus one can create as many different systems of human knowledge as 
there are mappemondes drawn from different viewpoints. But even if we drop the 
illusion of the single right order, the question still remains, what the criteria of the best 
encyclopaedic order are. For d'Alembert, since l’enchaînement of sciences is the goal of 
the Encyclopédie, “of all the encyclopedic trees the one that offered the largest number 
of connections and relationships among the sciences would doubtless deserve 
preference.”10 
As we can see, Diderot and d’Alembert were struggling with their classification 
because it involved an important decision, which cannot be easily revoked. As 
d’Alembert admits, one could choose to distribute knowledge according to entirely 
different sets of categories, like “natural and revealed knowledge, or useful and pleasing 
knowledge, or speculative and practical knowledge, or evident, certain, probable, and 
sensitive knowledge, or knowledge of things and knowledge of signs, and so on into 
infinity.”11 The division by subject matters is thus a compromise, which must be 
amended using a second, complementing layer of classification, so that the 
encyclopedic order would better express the logical connections of ideas.  
In the article “Encyclopédie” (published in the fifth volume in 1755), Diderot 
defends cross-references as the most important part of the encyclopedic order. There are 
two types of cross-references: the ones that have a more technical use (les renvois des 
mots), because they link particular terms in an entry with another entry, where this very 
term is explained. These are intended to avoid duplicating definitions. But the second 
type of cross-references (les renvois des choses) is more important because they provide 
links between different articles that are not in direct affiliation in the encyclopedic 
classificatory tree.
12
 If we consult the article “Analogy,” for instance, we find that it is a 
term in logic and grammar, which in turn reveals the place of the article in the 
systematic chart. But analogy is something pertaining to a much wider use than only 
these two branches, and so when the explanation touches the topic of reasoning from 
                                                                                                                       
investigates. See d’Alembert, Preliminary Discourse, 22f. 
9
 D’Alembert, Preliminary Discourse, 47. 
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 Ibid., 48. 
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 Ibid., 49. 
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analogy (for example, from similar visible qualities of two objects to the similarity of 
their internal invisible qualities), one may follow a cross-reference “Knowledge” 
(Connoissance), consult the article by that name and find there the topic discussed more 
thoroughly. It enables the reader to easily jump from one article to another, and, more 
importantly, to introduce a whole new layer of connections between parts of knowledge 
that are not present in the systematic chart. The general classification knows only the 
relations of subordination of sciences while cross-references also introduced the logical 
relations and resemblances between parts of knowledge very far apart in the 
classificatory tree. Also, cross-references mitigated or counter-balanced the effect of 
arbitrariness necessarily involved in the systematic chart because by adding a whole 
new network of links between articles the editors had actually included a series of 
alternative classifications and had thereby multiplied the points of view from which 
human knowledge could be observed. 
While it is hard to underestimate the importance of the Encyclopédie for the 
philosophical and social project of Enlightenment, one should not forget that Diderot 
and d’Alembert were also the pioneers of editorship in the history of encyclopedic 
publishing. If it seems natural to a modern reader to find the articles in this type of 
reference work organized alphabetically and cross-referenced, it must be said that for 
the editors of the Encyclopédie such practices called for some apologetics. Leibniz, on 
the other hand, envisioned an encyclopedia radically different from the principles 
adopted in the Encyclopédie and from the ones we have come to expect a modern 
encyclopedia should exemplify. 
 
 
III. Leibniz’s demonstrative encyclopedia 
 
The main objection Leibniz would have addressed to the French editors probably 
would have been that to base the encyclopedic order on anything like the système figuré, 
that is, on arbitrary lines between subject matters that constitute different sciences and 
arts, is essentially missing the point that there is a fundamental unity underlying all 
knowledge. No additional arrangement of cross-references can restore this unity after 
the original divisions have been made. The principal method of presenting knowledge 
should always be the way in which it is internally structured, that is, either discovered or 
demonstrated. It is the laws of logic, and not an extrinsic taxonomy of human activities, 
that govern Leibniz’s encyclopedia. 
This, in fact, may be the most important idea Leibniz shared with Descartes. As we 
shall se, the borders separating the disciplines are not only arbitrary for Leibniz, but 
even unnecessary altogether since science is but one. As Descartes says in the opening 
sections of the Rules for the Direction of the Mind, there is only one wisdom and one 
science and it is unreasonable for a philosopher to pursue truth in the way artisans work, 
namely, by dedicating themselves to only one skill. While the rules of every art might 
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differ, the laws of reason are always the same regardless of what they are applied to.
13
 
In fact, knowledge is constituted by the very fact that all of its parts are logically 
connected. It is in this sense that Leibniz’s encyclopedia manifests its demonstrative 
character. Not only was it supposed to refer to or describe demonstrations carried out 
elsewhere, but also encyclopedia itself was intended to become a book of 
demonstrations. 
As we know, Leibniz never got to carry out his encyclopedia. What we have from 
him are countless notes, letters and sketches that only give us a very general idea, 
although an original one, of how the whole project would have been constructed. That is 
not to say that it was on the periphery of his interests. Quite on the contrary, he was 
very much engaged in trying to define the project from as early as 1660’s when he 
conceived of an ordered bibliographic review of literature on the matters of 
jurisprudence.  
Leibniz plan revolves around a cluster of ideas in his logic that he had been 
developing throughout his life. It is tightly connected to his universal characteristic, a 
new kind of ideal scientific language based on a notation not unlike that of algebra, and 
to the idea of general science of synthesis and analysis, which he considered the core of 
all logic. What this general science consists of, in short, is a method of analysis of any 
truth into simpler ones by way of definitions, which makes possible the subsequent 
synthesis of simple truths into complex ones by what Leibniz had called ‘the art of 
combinations’ in his Dissertatione de arte combinatoria (1666). Because for Leibniz a 
demonstration of a typical proposition containing a subject and a predicate contains 
definitions of both terms, which might then be analysable further into simpler truths, it 
is possible, at least for the knowledge which is attainable a priori, to arrive at the first 
and most simple truths or pure indefinable identities or tautologies. For Leibniz, as for 
Locke, a true definition of a thing is not a simple affair of finding the genus proximum 
and differentia specifica, but rather a complete list of predicates of the subject, 
organized hierarchically according to their order of dependencies, so that the gradual 
composition of simpler truths into more complex ones gives us a complete explanation 
and a demonstration of the proposition we are researching.
14
 That alone is one of the 
principle ideas of Leibniz, but it is nothing new as a very similar view of the method of 
discovery, albeit much less developed, can also be found in Descartes’ Rules. But 
Leibniz had taken this approach much further in that he imagined that we would, if we 
could analyse all truths using this method, arrive at what he called ‘an alphabet of 
human thoughts,’15 that is, an inventory of simple truths every fact about the world is 
composed of, not unlike words are composed of the letters of the alphabet. As we shall 
see, these simple thoughts were to become the main building blocks of his encyclopedia 
so that its principal part would put forward a catalogue of human thoughts, rationally 
organized according to their logical successions. 
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Besides the principle of sufficient reason, Leibniz’s logic contains another famous 
idea tightly connected with it, namely, the claim that the predicate is not something 
attributed to the subject from without, but that it is always in the subject, which means 
that for a true proposition about anything, the predicates attributed to that thing add up 
to its complete concept – they are a part of its definition. The reason this principle was 
important for Leibniz’s encyclopedic project is that it enabled him to enlarge his general 
science of synthesis and analysis to all truths, even empirical ones, the ones that are not 
necessary but merely contingent. This »wonderful secret,«16 as Leibniz called it, reveals 
that the only difference between necessary and contingent truth is that of the scope of 
their analyses. The decomposition into simpler elements in a complex contingent truth 
is infinite, it rests on an infinite number of conditions unachievable by human finite 
intellect, but that is not to say that they are any less necessary to the One that can 
execute the infinite decomposition of truths, that is, to God. The alphabet of human 
thoughts is thus an ideal, which is not within reach of human mind in its entirety. We 
will never complete the analysis of the world and so it will be necessary, in the field of 
empirical knowledge, to work with concepts which are not entirely simple, but, as 
Leibniz puts it, are at least »not very far from being simple«.17  
After his journey to Paris, probably around 1676,
18
 Leibniz added another layer to 
his grand project: the universal characteristic. In one of the many shorter texts about this 
wonderful invention, Leibniz wrote: 
 
If there were either a certain precise language (called Adamic by some authors) or at 
least a kind of truly philosophical writing, through which notions would be retraced to 
an alphabet of human thoughts, then all those things that can be reached by reason from 
the data would be discoverable by means of a sort of calculus – like problems in 




Leibniz conceived of assigning a system of unique characters to our thoughts in 
such a way that the only possible combinations of characters would mirror the possible 
combinations of concepts represented by them. He was convinced that with such 
consistency, where language of written characters would be reduced to a calculus, false 
propositions could simply not be written as the implicit grammar of this language would 
not permit, for instance, the combination of ’square’ and ‘circle’ into a new composed 
character. The term ‘alphabet of human thoughts,’ if we consider that it was to be 
equipped with actual written signs, was for Leibniz much more than a convenient 
metaphor. The demonstrations using this language would in fact be unambiguous just 
like the demonstrations of mathematical theorems. Leibniz had repeatedly imagined that  
 
once this is performed, every paralogism will be nothing but a calculation mistake and 
every sophism expressed in this new kind of writing will in turn be nothing but a 
solecism or barbarism, easily refutable by this philosophical grammar’s rules. 
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Henceforth, whenever controversies arise, there will be no need of more disputation 
than what occurs between two philosophers or calculators. It will be sufficient to pick 
up their pens, sit down at the desks (abacus) and say to each other (eventually 




Moreover, the characteristic signs attributed to our thoughts would significantly 
facilitate not only the demonstration of truths but also the art of discovery of new ones 
as particular characters would, by means of a simple notation, imply both the 
subordinate characters they could be analysed into and the possible characters 
representing thoughts they could compose. It is perhaps no surprise that Leibniz had 
come to the conclusion that numbers were the best candidates for such a language and 
he had worked out several attempts, which indicate how these characteristic numbers 
should be assigned to concepts that constitute our thoughts.
21
 Again, the knowledge 
drawn from empirical observations and experiments is not exempted from this tool of 
logic, for while it is true that in this domain the simple truths are not completely within 
reach, Leibniz maintained that one could start with hypothetical numerical characters 
and work with them until more is known about the subject. Leibniz was confident that 
the characteristic would still permit knowledge of the merely probable to be 
demonstrative and deductive by way of testing hypotheses and conjectures. However, 
how this logic of probability would conform to the universal characteristic of the truths 
known a priori is not entirely clear from the numerous partial designs left to us by 
Leibniz. 
The general science of analysis and synthesis together with the universal 
characteristic forms the central structure of Leibniz’s encyclopedia and, as Couturat 
noted, there seems to be a central paradox in that the two presuppose one another.
22
 An 
encyclopedia, as far as it is designed to be an inventory of human thoughts, can be 
rendered truly demonstrative only insofar as it is expressed in the language of the 
characteristic, but the characteristic, on the other hand, requires that the alphabet of 
human thoughts had already been completed, in other words, that human knowledge 
had already been analysed into simple thoughts as far as possible. The only viable 
procedure for Leibniz was that the two be developed together. Leibniz was convinced 
that with a team of experts the project could be completed in a few years and during his 
life he made several unsuccessful efforts to convince men of power and scientific 
societies, such as the Royal Society of London or the Académie des Sciences, to grant 
support for his project. 
Of course, one would be excused to think that all this is not enough. After all, this 
general science is not an encyclopedia in any familiar sense of the word but rather a 
scientific method. Leibniz wrote several shorter texts containing details about what the 
encyclopedia should contain and his proposals differ according to how his idea 
developed over time. A few elements, though, are remarkably persistent: 
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The first is that an encyclopedia, in a large part, would still be a summary of all 
books, only that their contents would now be distributed according to the logical order. 
Every description, demonstration, proof or discovery would be given a proper place 
according to the logical order of general science. In this way – and this is probably the 
most striking feature of Leibniz’s project – the map of human achievements would 
become visible, as it would become immediately apparent what discoveries are yet to be 
made and what gaps are to be filled, which proofs can be deduced on the basis of what 
observations and nobody would waste their efforts with research and experiments that 
have already been made.
23
 In a sense, the encyclopedia would become not only a 
catalogue of knowledge but also a true platform of scientific progress since new 
achievements would not need to be published separately as treatises, but rather as 
amendments to the encyclopedia. 
Further, an encyclopedia would include an Universal Atlas of tables, charts, figures, 
maps, diagrams, genealogical trees, lists, etc., in short, an enormous non textual 




Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Leibniz was well aware of the importance of 
an index. Unfortunately, like in the case of so many other elements of his encyclopedia, 
Leibniz said very little about how this index was to be carried out in the physical 
volumes of his encyclopedia, but it is clear from the final chapter the New Essays on 
Human Understanding that he considered an index to be the main tool of orientation. 
While it is true that he is far from being an originator of the index as we know it today 
as these had appeared in printed reference works soon after Gutenberg, there is 
nevertheless a distinctive and original feature in Leibniz’s application of it in that he 
seems to imply that a well composed index is something that can substitute hierarchical 
classifications of sciences altogether. The critique of Locke’s division of sciences in the 
New Essays can be read against any classifying impulse that ends up drawing a 
genealogical or hierarchical tree of sciences and arts, including the one of Diderot’s and 
d’Alembert’s kind. 
In the final chapter of his Essay, Locke adopts the traditional threefold division of 
sciences into physics or natural philosophy, ethics or practical philosophy, and logic or 
the doctrine of signs that had been suggested by the Stoics. Locke maintained that these 
were »the three great provinces of the intellectual world, wholly separate and distinct 
one from another«25 and it is these concluding words of the whole Essay that Leibniz 
could not agree with. For him, these »great provinces of the encyclopedia«26 (although 
Locke does not mention an encyclopedia at all, it is clear that Leibniz saw Locke’s 
division as a possible distribution of topics in one) are destined to be in »a continuous 
                                         
23
 See Leibniz, “Recommandation pour instituer la science générale,” in Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, 
VI, 4, ed. Hans Schepers et al. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1999), 694ff. See also Couturat, La logique de 
Leibniz, 150-1. 
24
 See Leibniz, “Atlas Universalis,” in Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, VI, 4, 86-90. 
25
 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1975), IV.xxi, §5. 
26
 Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, trans. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), IV.xxi, §4. 
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war«27 because each of these disciplines can accommodate the other two. Minds or 
spirits, for instance, can be treated in natural philosophy insofar as they are substances, 
in practical philosophy insofar as they are the subjects of good and evil, and in logic, 
since it prescribes the laws of thinking. Any topic can be discussed as a part of practical 
philosophy if it contributes to human happiness. And logic or the doctrine of signs, of 
which language is a part, is once again a doctrine that can accommodate anything 
whatsoever as far as it is expressed through various forms of communication. Divisions 
of sciences are thus for Leibniz not real partitions, but rather wholly arbitrary points of 
view of the whole. All traditional tree-like divisions are subject to one principal 
shortcoming, namely, that any subject never belongs only to a single category, a 
problem librarians are well aware of, as they often have difficulties finding a place for a 
book, which could be put into two or three equally relevant places.
28
 
For Leibniz, as for Diderot and d’Alembert, the problem of division of sciences was 
not only theoretical but also practical as it was necessary to arrange the contents of the 
encyclopedia in a particular way. The solution Leibniz proposed was not so different 
from Locke, but he did reinterpret the scheme in a novel way to conform to his idea of 
general science: physics, being in Leibniz’s view a deductive science, follows a 
synthetic (or theoretical) method of ordering truths »according to their origins«; 
practical philosophy or ethics, on the other hand, orders truths in an analytical way 
»according to their usage«, starting from the aims of man (his happiness) it analyses 
phenomena and seeks their causes.
29
 The theoretical and the practical, which correspond 
to physics and ethics of the Stoics and Locke, are thus not two distinct disciplines, but 
rather »different arrangements of the same truths«.30 The third disposition that needs to 
be added into this picture is logic or the doctrine of signs, that is, the disposition 
according to the terms of language and its sole purpose is to provide a repertoire of all 
the terms used in the first two arrangements. And that is precisely what an index is to 
Leibniz: a systematic and an alphabetical list of predicaments any concept can be 
combined with, which is designed to »find together all the propositions into which the 
term enters in a sufficiently remarkable manner«.31  The index is a tool, which enables 
the reader to educate himself about a particular topic, regardless whether it is treated 





Thus we have at least two reasons to abandon the système figuré in a Leibnizian 
approach: the first is that because the truths of human knowledge exhibit a fundamental 
unity of their logical structure, the borders between different fields of knowledge based 
on subject matters are but arbitrary and have, so to speak, no ontological value; and the 












second, that with a good index, the tree-like structure becomes redundant in that it 
provides us with an alternative and much better method of finding truths. While Diderot 
and D’Alembert acknowledged the arbitrariness of their taxonomy but had nevertheless 
kept it for practical reasons of orientation, Leibniz, with his experience with library 
catalogues and alphabetical indices,
32
 imagined a much more powerful organizing tool, 
a sort of universal inventory of categories and ideas with their possible combinations. 
As has been pointed out by Robert McRae, it seems that while in the Encyclopédie the 
classification of sciences and arts by subject-matters of the système figuré is primary but 
its arbitrariness and rigidity has to be amended with a complex network of logical cross-
references, in Leibniz’s encyclopedia the logical arrangement of truths based on 




Any hierarchical system of knowledge which takes types of objects rather than the 
alphabet of human thoughts as its fundamental elements suffers from a critical flaw 
according to Leibniz, namely that it ends up fragmenting the unity of knowledge 
according to arbitrary instead of logical, or rather, contingent instead of necessary 
criteria. An encyclopedia of which the contents are arranged around the boundaries of 
particular sciences, regardless whether they be organized by topics (as in the case of the 
Natural History of Pliny the Elder and the Etymologies of Isidore of Seville) or 
alphabetically (as in Chambers’ Cyclopaedia and the Encyclopédie), fails to represent 
the world we live in completely, as it doesn’t make the logical structure of knowledge 
its primary principle of organization.  
Leibniz’s idea of an index as a primary searching tool that enables to keep the 
logical unity of knowledge intact thus makes all metaphors of ‘fields of knowledge,’ 
‘trees of sciences’ and ‘mappemondes’ misleading at best, since it is not the contents of 
the encyclopedia that need to be distributed into various branches, provinces and 
categories but rather it is that each unit of the contents is to be equipped with a series of 
categories, keywords or tags. And this, I claim, is the true shift of the perspective: it 
enables orientation without parcelling as things do not dwell inside categories anymore, 
each thing restricted to only one of them, but rather is each thing attributed with a 
number of common descriptors that compose an index. In short, it is not things that are 
distributed into categories but rather are categories assigned to things. That is perhaps 
the Aristotelian side of Leibniz and although he never advanced his work on the 
encyclopedia beyond plans, it seems that the strategies for coping with information 
overload in our digital age favour the Leibnizian approach rather than the later model of 
the Encyclopédie. 
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